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In Debriefing the President: The Interrogation of Saddam Hussein, John Nixon tells the fascinating
story of Saddam Hussein’s capture and interrogation. At the same time, writes Joe Devanny, Nixon excoriates the
George W. Bush administration’s approach to intelligence and policy in the build-up to the Iraq war. This is a short,
highly readable book, suffused with controlled anger at the intelligence community’s shortcomings, but also offering
some striking lessons for would-be intelligence analysts and policymakers, underlining the risks of unchallenged
assumptions and the pitfalls of decision-making with imperfect information and political bias.
Debriefing the President: The Interrogation of Saddam Hussein. John Nixon. Bantam Press. 2016.
Find this book: 
Intelligence analysts enjoy unfettered access to information about their ‘targets’
in order to produce deep insights for the benefit of policymakers and political
leaders. Despite the breadth and depth of this access, analysts commonly
operate at one remove: they never actually get to meet their targets.  For John
Nixon, the terms of this deal were turned upside down.  As a leadership analyst
of Iraq for the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Nixon was one of the first
people to interrogate Saddam Hussein following Hussein’s December 2003
capture.
Nixon’s Debriefing the President: The Interrogation of Saddam Hussein vividly
conveys the best and worst aspects of a career in intelligence analysis. He
clearly relished his analytical role as one of the US intelligence community’s
resident experts on Saddam, spending several years poring over every available
scrap of information to form a picture of what made him tick. And at the heart of
this book is the fascinating story of how Nixon was involved in the search for
Saddam after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Then, hours after special operations
forces had apprehended a suspect, it was Nixon’s responsibility to travel to the
detention site and perform an identification check to see if they really had found
and detained Saddam Hussein.
It may surprise readers that Nixon had to frantically write down his checklist in the hours immediately preceding the
first interrogation, compiling a list of questions and things to look out for in the identification process, including tribal
tattoos on Saddam’s right hand. Nixon reflects that no-one in the US government had expected Saddam to be
captured alive, believing he would fight to the end.
This is but one, and by no means the worst, mistake catalogued by Nixon in the US preparations to invade and
occupy Iraq. Having spent years trying to join the CIA, Nixon narrates his difficult first few years in the Agency, citing
several examples of the bureaucratic frustrations that can await eager, newly-minted intelligence analysts: his
managers gave him a hard time, were sceptical as to whether he had anything to offer and reportedly chose to take
advice from within their social circle rather than on the basis of expertise. Nixon laments a bureaucratic culture in
which telling senior officials and political leaders what they wanted to hear distorted the process of telling them what
they needed to hear.
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This process worked on two levels: directives from above to find information that confirmed existing assumptions
(where are the WMD?), and influence from within the Agency’s management shaping the flow of information
upwards to smooth over dissent and remove contextual insights deemed interesting but not useful for senior policy
customers. Nixon laments the CIA’s ‘service-provider’ culture – blamed on George Tenet’s leadership (1996-2004) –
which has devalued the Agency’s contribution to policymakers’ understanding of key issues. As one example, he
criticises the proliferation of ‘pithy one-page memos,’ regarded as ‘crack cocaine for consumers of classified
information’ but reducing the Agency’s ability to disseminate deeper analysis. Less plausibly, Nixon argues that
policymakers are ‘too busy to know what they should be focusing on’, such that intelligence analysts should wrestle
back control over the agenda. Analysts should feel that policymakers welcome independent insights, but pace Nixon,
intelligence is a service to policymakers, who will always be in the driving seat, as they should be in a democratic
system.
Image Credit: Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander of V Corps and Joint Task Force Seven,
and Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, Coalition Provisional Authority administrator, talk to
reporters at the Baghdad Forum, 14 December 2003, about the capture of Saddam Hussein
by coalition forces a day earlier in Tikrit, Iraq (Staff Sgt Steven Pearsall CC0)
In his own words, Nixon ‘played a very small part in a very large disaster in American foreign policy:  the Iraq War’.
Debriefing the President is laced with professional frustration and suffused with controlled anger about the Bush
administration’s approach to Iraq.  At one point, this anger overflows in an ill-judged, two-page comparison of
Saddam and Bush, noting their similarly ‘haughty’ and ‘imperious’ manners, that both were ‘fairly ignorant of the
outside world’ and ‘surrounded themselves with compliant advisers and had little tolerance for dissent’.  Nixon’s
criticism is not confined to Bush, but his critique of Obama’s Iraq policy is more measured, pointing to Obama’s
failure to deal effectively with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (2006-14), to renegotiate an agreement to keep US
forces in Iraq and generally to devote sufficient attention and resources to Iraq policy.
Although Nixon mostly blames the Bush administration, he does not exempt the CIA from censure.  He claims that
the Agency’s management ‘slavishly sought to do the president’s bidding – as it usually does – in an effort to get a
seat near the center of power and justify its budget’.  Nixon is guilty, to a degree, of failing to recognise the
responsibility of senior officials to protect the Agency’s standing, and indeed its budget. The challenge, of course, is
to uphold the integrity of the intelligence process at the same time as ensuring a sound relationship with the White
House. Controlling for Nixon’s anger and frustration, he has nevertheless marshalled compelling evidence that the
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CIA at times fell short of maintaining this delicate but important balance.
Nixon writes of the lack of good intelligence and understanding of Iraqi politics before 2003. In particular, he
highlights ignorance of the risks of Sunni-Shia tensions that were to engulf post-invasion Iraq.  He attributes this
shortcoming to a systemic inability to understand the complexity of Iraqi politics and society underneath the grip of
Saddam’s repressive regime.  In 1999, for example, Nixon claims the CIA didn’t recognise the significance of the
murder of Shia cleric Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, whose son, Muqtada, would become a leading Shia opponent to
the Coalition Provisional Authority and new Iraqi government. The bitter sectarian conflict that followed the invasion
demonstrates the terrible consequences of this intelligence and policy failure.
Nixon argues persuasively that the true dynamics of Saddam’s regime eluded the US intelligence and policy
communities in part because of the dated, patchy and partisan sources of information they relied on to inform their
assessments. They missed, for example, the fact that Saddam had largely disengaged himself from foreign policy
decision-making: he preferred to spend time on other pursuits, such as writing novels. Nixon states that prior to the
invasion there were fragments of evidence pointing to some of these facts, but these were lost in the noise of more
prevalent, inaccurate information, and the wider rush to war.
Nixon clearly disliked the flood of new CIA analysts assigned to cover Iraq before and after the 2003 invasion. These
new analysts were either ‘green’ and lacked ‘analytical skills’ or else ‘careerists looking for a new horse to ride in the
race for promotions […] The era of analytic mediocrity had begun, and Iraq was its first casualty’. For Nixon, what
matters is that intelligence analysts are afforded the time and space to become genuine experts: ‘The right answer
comes when you have analysts with depth, not when you have a large analytic cadre.’
Given its compelling story, Nixon’s short, highly readable book should inspire anyone contemplating a career in
intelligence analysis. Nixon’s enthusiasm for his craft exudes from every chapter. But the book also sounds a
sharper, more cautionary note, counselling would-be intelligence analysts about the pitfalls lurking in their possible
future, the frustrations of working in a big, politicised bureaucracy, the limits of intelligence and the structural barriers
to making a significant contribution to government. Indeed, at times, Nixon’s reminiscences about the CIA’s culture
and senior leadership are so caustic that readers of this book may think twice about wanting to join the Agency and
about its capacity to deliver strong, independent assessments to the White House.
US intelligence experts have done much to develop the practice and profession of intelligence analysis, from
Sherman Kent onwards.  But the investment by successive US administrations in time, expertise and significant
sums of money to improve its analyses hasn’t always led to better decision-making. Nixon notes Obama’s
scepticism of intelligence agencies for precisely this reason. Nixon argues convincingly that intelligence analysis has
its limits: it should focus on information and insight and foreswear prediction and policy advice. Intelligence analysts
need to develop deep subject-matter expertise as much as new analytical techniques and, above all else,
policymakers and political leaders must be reflective and confident enough to afford intelligence its due weight and
attention in the policymaking process. Moreover, senior intelligence officials must safeguard the independence and
integrity of the analytical process from direct and indirect politicisation. These would be salutary lessons at any time,
but they have become even more salient since the election of President Donald Trump.
Surprisingly, Nixon claims that he struggled to find an interested publisher when he first pitched the book in 2011.
This is perhaps proof of how interest in Iraq had waned since 2003, only to surge again with the rise of ISIS. In this
respect, the book’s fate is itself a commentary on a salient shortcoming of US and wider Western foreign policy: a
deficit of strategic patience and the concomitant failure to appreciate the longer-term impact of false economies,
especially those relating to our investment in understanding areas of major operational activity.
Dr Joe Devanny is a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Security Analysis, part of the Policy Institute at
King’s College London. Follow him on Twitter @josephdevanny. Read more by Joe Devanny.
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Note: This review gives the views of the author, and not the position of the LSE Review of Books blog, or of the
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